กใฬ\่i2020N2`4j
e[}: Machine Learning and Mechanism Design
Reading Lists (Tentative)
Dutting,
Feng, Golowich, Narasimhan, Parkes, and Ravindranath. 2019. gMachine Learning for
Optimal Economic Design.h in Future of Economic Design (ed.by
Laslier)
Dutting,
Feng, Narasimhan, Parkes, Ravindranath. 2019. gOptimal Auctions through
Deep Learning.
Fudenberg
and Liang. 2019. gPredicting and Understanding Initial Play.h AER.
Fudenberg,
Kleinberg, Liang, Mullainathan. 2019. gMeasuring the Completeness of Theories.h
Kevin
Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2017. gEconomics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation.h
PNAS.
Milgrom
and Tadelis. 2019. gHow Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market
Design.h NBER.
Newman,
Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2018. gAssessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for
Radio Spectrum.h
Sandholm.
2019. gAutomated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search
Algorithms.h
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Dutting,
Feng, Golowich, Narasimhan, Parkes, and Ravindranath. 2019. gMachine Learning for
Optimal Economic Design.h in Future of Economic Design (ed.by
Laslier)
บฑฝ
Dutting,
Feng, Narasimhan, Parkes, Ravindranath. 2019. gOptimal Auctions through
Deep Learning.
ycเ u
Sandholm.
2019. gAutomated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search
Algorithms.h
ผบU
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Fudenberg
and Liang. 2019. gPredicting and Understanding Initial Play.h AER.
ฝ๒rF
Fudenberg,
Kleinberg, Liang, Mullainathan. 2019. gMeasuring the Completeness of Theories.h
ฌั๋T
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Kevin
Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2017. gEconomics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation.h
PNAS.
Milgrom
and Tadelis. 2019. gHow Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market
Design.h NBER.
Newman,
Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2018. gAssessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for
Radio Spectrum.h
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Matsushima, H.: gEfficient
Combinatorial Exchanges,h 2011.
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Ulku, L. (ITAM): gOptimal Combinatorial
Auction Designh, mimeo, 2011
Edelman, B. and M. Schwarz: gOptimal
Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions,h AER,
May 2010
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Cramton, P. gSpectrum Auction Designh 2009.
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gOn UK Ofcom 2.6
GHz Auctionh
Jewitt, I. and Z. Li,
gReport on the 2008 UK 10-40 GHz Spectrum Auctionh 2008
Cramton, P. gA Review of the 10-40 GHz Auctionh 2008
Cramton,
P. gA Review of the L-band Auctionh
2008
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gOn Japan 4G License Product Designh
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Microeconomics and Development Economics (2012)
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Combinatorial Exchanges,h 2011.
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2
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Matsushima, H.: gJapanese Package Auction Format (JP): Practical Design for 4G
Spectrum Allocation in Japan,h 2012
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3
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Sano,
R. gThe Vickrey-Target
Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctionsh,
mimeo, 2012
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Kamenica,
E., and M. Gentzkow (2011): gBayesian Persuasion,h American Economic Review 101, 2590-2615.
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EVPX๚ฮjXFOO`SFOO
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Ely,
J. (2016): Beeps, mimeo.
๑าFฉฉบY
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E84๚ุj13FOO`19FOO
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Sannikov,
Y. (2008): gA Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problemh, R. E. Stud.
SADZIK, T. and E. STACCHETTIi2015j: gAGENCY MODELS WITH
FREQUENT ACTIONS,h Econometrica.
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E93๚yjXFOO`SFOO
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Sannikov, Y. (2007): gGames with Imperfectly Observable
Actions in Continuous Time,h Econometrica
๑าF{บซI
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E94๚๚jPQFOO`TFOO
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Sannikov, Y. (2007): gGames with Imperfectly Observable
Actions in Continuous Time,h EconometricaiO๑ฬฑซj
๑าF{บซI
ๆ27๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPUj
E108๚yjXFOO`SFOO
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Lambert and Horner (2016): gMotivational Rating,h mimeo.
๑าFcขu
Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2014): gImplementing the
gWisdom of the Crowdh,h JPE.
๑าFะRRซ
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E116๚i๚jj10F00`16F00
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Frazier,
Kempe, Kleinberg and Kleinberg (2014): "Incentivizing Exploration"
๑าFะRRซ
28th AMF Meeting, Nov 6, 2016 (U. Tokyo, Econ. 10F, Room 4)
Frazier, Kempe,
Kleinberg and Kleinberg (2014): "Incentivizing Exploration,"
Reporter: Katayama
ๆ29`35๑F
` Second Course in Algorithm (Tim Roughgarden)
http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/w16/w16.html
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.1,2,3
๑าFฉฉAฌcด
29th
AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden
(2016) g` Second Course in
Algorithmh Ch.1,2,3: Reporters, Asami (1,2), Odahara (3)
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.3.4.
๑าFฉฉAฌcดAc
30th
AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden
(2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.3,4: Reporters, Asami, Odahara, Nakada
ๆ31๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPVj
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.4,5,6,7.8.9
๑าFcAะRAAผบ
31th
AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden
(2016) g` Second
Course in Algorithmh Ch.4,5,6,7,8,9: Reporters, Nakada, Katarama, Higashi,
Matsumura
ๆ32๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPVj
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.10,11,12
๑าFบAข่
ๆ33๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPVj
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.13,14,15
๑าFข่
ๆ34๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPVj
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.16,17,18
๑าFข่
ๆ35๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPVj
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Tim Roughgarden (2016) g` Second Course in Algorithmh
Ch.19,20จๆัลฟใฐ
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EPU๚iyjjPRFOO`PVFOO
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Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,h American Economic Review.
๑าFLIU, Xinyu
Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa.
2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic
Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.
๑าFโฃS๎
ๆ37๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPWj
EP20๚iyjjPRFOO`PVFOO
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Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious Strategy-Proof
Mechanisms,h American Economic Review. (Continued)
๑าFบฑฝ
Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa.
2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic
Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.
๑าFโฃS๎
ๆ38๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPWj
EP27๚iyjjPRFOO`PVFOO
ๅwๅw@oฯwคศๆSคฏคบi10Fj
Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,h American Economic Review. (Continued again)
๑าFบฑฝ
Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa. 2016.
gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic
Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.
๑าFโฃS๎
ๆ39๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPWj
E210๚iyjjPRFOO`PVFOO
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Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa.
2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic
Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.iContinuedj
๑าFโฃS๎
Akbarpour, M., Shengwu Li (17):
gCredible Mechanism Design.h mimeo.
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Eyster, Erik, and Matthew Rabin.
2005. gCursed equilibrium.h Econometrica, 73(5): 1623–1672.
๑าFอดu
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Esponda, Ignacio. 2008. gBehavioral
equilibrium in economies with adverse selection.h The American Economic Review,
98(4): 1269–1291.
๑าFบฑฝ
Jehiel, Philippe. 2005.
gAnalogy-based expectation equilibrium.h Journal of Economic theory, 123(2):
81–104.
๑าFข่
ๆ41๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPXjFubN`F[
E113๚i๚jjPOFOO`PRFOO
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Nakamoto, S. (2008):
"Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system."
Böhme, R., N. Christin, B. Edelman, and
T. Moore (2015): gBitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance.h Journal
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E113๚i๚jjPSFOO`PVFOO
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Biais, B., C. Bisiere, M. Bouvard, and C. Casamatta (2017):
"The Blockchain Folk Theorem."
๑าFycเ u
ๆ43๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPXjFubN`F[
E114๚ijjPOFOO`PRFOO
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Biais, B., C. Bisiere, M. Bouvard, and C. Casamatta (2017):
"The Blockchain Folk Theorem."iฑซj
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E126๚iyjjPOFOO`PRFOO
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Huberman, G., J. D. Leshno,
and C. Moallemi (2017): "Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic
Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System."
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E126๚iyjjPSFOO`PVFOO
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Cong, L. W. and Z. He (2017):
gBlockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts.h
๑าFฒกFบ
ๆ46๑JjYfUCืญ๏iQOPXjFubN`F[
E127๚i๚jjPOFOO`PRFOO
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(2018): gBlockchain Economicsh.
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(2018): gBlockchain Economicshiฑซj
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Budish, E. (2018):
"The economic limits of bitcoin and the blockchain."
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Saleh, F. (2018):
"Blockchain Without Waste: Proof-of-Stake."
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Gui, G., A. Hortaçsu, and J. Tudón
(2018): "A Memo on the Proof-of-Stake Mechanism."
๑าFฌั๋T
Saleh, F. (2018): "Volatility and
Welfare in a Crypto Economy."
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Bergemann and Bonatti (2019):
gMarket for Information: An Introduction.h
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Emir
Kamenica (2018): gBayesian persuasion and information designh
๑าFฝ๒rF
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Weyl and Zhang (2018): gDepreciating
Licenses.h
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